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This paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financial-stability policies. There
are three main points. First, from a normative perspective, the model defines the fundamental market
failure to be addressed, namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in
which intermediaries issue too much short-term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to
costly financial crises. Second, it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the
only lenders, conventional monetary-policy tools such as open-market operations can be used to regulate
this externality, while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy
with other measures. Third, from a positive perspective, the model provides an account of how monetary
policy can influence bank lending and real activity, even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly
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  I.  Introduction 
  The modern literature on monetary policy emphasizes the central bank’s role in 
fostering price stability.
1  Historically, however, a dominant concern for central bankers 
has been not just price stability, but also financial stability.  Goodhart (1988) argues that 
the original motivation for creating central banks in many countries was to temper the 
financial crises associated with unregulated “free banking” regimes: 
  “In the nineteenth century, the advocates of free banking argued that the banking 
system could be trusted to operate effectively without external constraints or 
regulation….[But] experience suggested that competitive pressures in a milieu of limited 
information (and, thence, contagion risks) would lead to procyclical fluctuations 
punctuated by banking panics.  It was this experience that led to the formation of 
noncompetitive, non-profit maximizing Central Banks.” (p. 77). 
 
A related emphasis on crisis mitigation is evident in Bagehot’s (1873) famous discussion 
of the lender-of-last-resort function.
2  And certainly, recent events have served to 
underscore the importance of the central bank’s role in preserving financial stability.  
  In this paper, I develop a model that speaks to the goals and methods of central-
bank financial-stability policies.  The first step is to define the fundamental market failure 
that needs to be addressed.  I begin with an unregulated banking system in which banks 
raise financing from households to invest in projects.  Banks can raise this financing in 
the form of either short-term or long-term debt.  Households are risk-neutral with respect 
to fluctuations in their consumption, but derive additional monetary services from 
holding any claim that is entirely riskless—with the notion being that riskless claims are 
easy to value and hence facilitate exchange among households.  I show that banks can 
manufacture some amount of riskless private “money” of this sort, thereby lowering their 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Goodfriend (2007) for a recent articulation of this view. 
 
2 Tucker (2009) paraphrases Bagehot’s (1873) dictum as follows: “to avert panic, central banks should lend 
early and freely (i.e., without limit) to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at ‘high rates’”.   2
financing costs.  Moreover, they can do so in greater quantity by issuing short-term debt, 
since it is harder for long-term bank debt to be made risk-free. 
  The role for financial-stability policy arises because the private choices of 
unregulated banks with respect to money creation are not in general socially optimal.  
When banks issue cheaper short-term debt, they capture its social benefits, namely the 
monetary services it generates for households.  However, they do not always fully 
internalize its costs.  In an adverse “financial crisis” state of the world, the only way for 
banks to honor their short-term debts is by selling assets at fire-sale prices.  I show that in 
equilibrium, the potential for such fire sales may give rise to a negative externality.  Thus 
left to their own devices, unregulated banks may engage in excessive money creation, 
and may leave the financial system overly vulnerable to costly crises. 
  There are a variety of ways for a regulator to address this externality.  One 
possibility is the use of conventional monetary-policy tools, i.e. open-market operations.  
To see how monetary policy might be of value, note that a crude approach to dealing with 
the externality would be for the regulator to just impose a cap on each bank’s total money 
creation.  However, when the regulator is imperfectly informed about banks’ investment 
opportunities, he will not know where to set the cap, since it is desirable for banks with 
stronger investment opportunities to do more money creation.  In this setting, the 
regulator can do better with a flexible “cap-and-trade” system in which banks are granted 
tradable permits, each of which allows them to do some amount of money creation.
3  The 
market price of the permits reveals information about banks’ investment opportunities to 
the regulator, who can then adjust the cap accordingly—when the price of the permits 
                                                 
3 Kashyap and Stein (2004) suggest using an analogous cap-and-trade approach to implement time-varying 
bank capital requirements. 
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goes up, this suggests that banks in the aggregate have strong investment opportunities, 
and so the regulator should loosen the cap by putting more permits into the system. 
  All of this may sound a bit like science fiction; we don’t observe cap-and-trade 
regulation of banks in the real world.  However if banks’ short-term liabilities are subject 
to reserve requirements, it turns out that monetary policy can be used as a mechanism for 
implementing the cap-and-trade approach.  When the central bank injects reserves into 
the system, it effectively increases the number of permits for private money creation.  
And the nominal interest rate, which captures the cost of holding reserves, functions as 
the permit price.  Thus open-market operations that adjust aggregate reserves in response 
to changes in short-term nominal rates can be use to achieve the cap-and-trade solution. 
  An interesting benchmark case is where reserve requirements apply to the money-
like liabilities of all lenders in the economy.  This allows the central bank to precisely 
control private money creation with monetary policy alone.   While this case may roughly 
capture the situation facing central banks at an earlier period in history, it is less realistic 
as a description of modern advanced economies.  Nowadays there are a range of short-
term financial-intermediary liabilities that are not subject to reserve requirements, and yet 
may both: i) provide monetary services; and ii) create fire-sale externalities. For example, 
Gorton and Metrick (2010), and Gorton (2010) argue that an important fraction of private 
money creation now takes place entirely outside of the formal banking sector, via the 
large volume of overnight repo finance in the “shadow banking” sector. 
  In this richer environment, monetary policy as it is conventionally practiced is 
generally not sufficient to rein in excessive money creation.  Continuing with the above 
example, it may in addition be necessary to regulate the volume of repo activity in the   4
shadow-banking sector, either by expanding the reach of reserve requirements, or by 
some other means.  Thus the model helps to make clear the circumstances under which 
monetary policy needs to be supplemented with other measures.  Moreover, it suggests 
that these other measures lie squarely in the central bank’s traditional domain, to the 
extent that they are also targeted at the fundamental externality associated with excessive 
private money creation.  This is of interest in light of the ongoing debate over the 
appropriate mix of central-bank tools for achieving financial stability.
4   
      In addition to its normative implications, the model is also relevant from a 
positive perspective.  It provides a coherent account of how monetary policy “works”—
i.e., of how open-market operations lead to changes in bank lending and output—in an 
environment that is arguably more realistic on some key dimensions than that found in 
other theories. In contrast to the usual model, all prices are perfectly flexible.  Moreover, 
I do not need to assume that the central bank has monopoly control over all forms of 
transactions media used by households. My model is unchanged if, for example, one 
introduces a set of non-reservable money-market-funds that provide the same monetary 
services to households as bank-created money.
5  Indeed, I consider the limiting case 
where the interest-rate spread between money and bonds is fixed and unresponsive to 
their relative supplies. Monetary policy works in this case not by changing real interest 
rates, but through a pure quantity effect: a loosening of policy allows banks to finance 
themselves with more of the cheaper money, which encourages them to do more lending. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g. Adrian and Shin (2008), and Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen (2010). 
 
5 To be clear on the distinction: my model assumes that the central bank acts as a regulator, controlling 
those forms of private money creation that lead to negative externalities—in particular, short-term bank 
debt that finances risky long-term assets.  However, it does not require the central bank to control other, 
more benign forms of money creation, e.g., money-market-fund accounts backed by Treasury bills.   
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  The ideas in this paper connect to several strands of previous work.  First, the 
basic model of fire sales that creates the rationale for policy intervention draws on 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1997).
6  Second, the insight that banks create a valuable 
transactions medium by issuing low-risk claims is formalized in Gorton and Pennacchi 
(1990).  Third, the notion that central bank reserves can be thought of as permits that 
allow banks to do more of a particular kind of cheap financing appears in Stein’s (1998) 
elaboration of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission.
7     
  And finally, in order to focus on the financial-stability consequences of monetary 
policy, it helps to set aside its effects on price stability.  I do so by appealing to the fiscal 
theory of the price level, according to which the price level is determined not by the 
monetary base, but by total outstanding nominal government liabilities—i.e., by the sum 
of Treasury securities and the monetary base.
8  This enables open-market operations that 
change the mix of Treasuries and bank reserves (while keeping their sum constant) to 
have real effects on bank investment and financing behavior, even in a world where all 
prices are perfectly flexible.  However, I also discuss how the model’s conclusions carry 
over to an alternative New-Keynesian setting with sticky prices, where price stability is 
governed by a version of the “Taylor rule” (Taylor, 1993, 1999).  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II develops the basic model 
of private money creation by banks.  Section III compares banks’ financing choices to the 
                                                 
6 On fire sales, see also Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Allen and Gale (2005), Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2010), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin 
(2004), Caballero and Simsek (2010), and Stein (2009). 
 
7 For early work on the bank lending channel see also Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox (1993), and Kashyap and Stein (2000). 
 
8 The fiscal theory is developed in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1998).  
My own adaptation of the theory is particularly indebted to Cochrane’s exposition. 
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social planner’s solution, and clarifies the conditions under which banks engage in 
excessive money creation.  It also shows that a cap-and-trade approach to regulation can 
be useful when the social planner has imperfect information.  Section IV demonstrates 
how the cap-and-trade approach can be implemented with open-market operations.   
Section V explores a number of other complementary policy tools; these include liquidity 
regulation, deposit insurance and a lender-of-last-resort function, as well as regulation of 
the shadow-banking sector.  Section VI discusses how the model differs from other 
accounts of the monetary transmission mechanism.  Conclusions are in Section VII.   
 
  II.  A Model of Private Money Creation 
  The model features three sets of actors: households, banks, and “patient 
investors”.  I begin by describing each of these groups, and then turn to the optimization 
problem faced by the banks.   
  A.  Households 
  There are three dates, 0, 1, and 2. At time 0, households have an initial 
endowment of the one good in the economy.  They can either consume this endowment at 
time 0, or invest some of it in financial assets and consume the proceeds from investment 
at time 2.  They have linear preferences over consumption at these two dates.  In addition 
to consumption, households also derive utility from monetary services.  The key 
assumption is that monetary services can be provided by any privately-created claim on 
time-2 consumption, so long as that claim is completely riskless.
9   Thus the utility of a 
representative household is given by: 
                                                 
9 This assumption is meant to capture, in a reduced-form way, the spirit of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), 
and Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom (2009).  These papers argue that information-insensitive securities are an   7
  02 () UC E C M β γ =+ + ,         ( 1 )  
where M represents the household’s time-0 holdings of privately-created “money”.
10  To 
be clear on the notational convention, when a household has M units of money at time 0, 
this means that it holds claims guaranteed to deliver M units of time-2 consumption. 
  Given their linear form, household preferences pin down two real rates.  The first 
is the (gross) real return on risky “bonds” that pay off at time 2, given by  1/
B R β = .   
The second is the (gross) real return on riskless “money”, given by  1/( )
M R β γ =+ , 
where  1 β γ +< .  The latter follows from the observation that a household is always 
indifferent between having: i) β γ +  units of time-0 consumption; or ii) a riskless claim 
that promises one unit of time-2 consumption,  since such a claim delivers β  of utility 
from expected future consumption, along with an additional γ  of utility in monetary 
services.  The bottom line is that because riskless money offers households a convenience 
yield that risky bonds do not, in equilibrium it must have a lower rate of return. 
  The idea that money has a lower return in equilibrium than bonds is standard in 
textbook models.  But here, the return spread is fixed and independent of the quantities of 
money and bonds, thanks to the linear preferences on the part of households.  This feature 
is not necessary for anything that follows, and is easily relaxed.  However, it serves to 
highlight a key novelty of my model: here changes in central bank policy work not by 
altering the real rates on either type of claim, but rather by varying the proportions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
attractive medium of exchange, because they eliminate the potential for adverse selection between 
transacting parties.  Riskless securities are, by definition, information-insensitive. 
 
10 In a similar formulation, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) put the stock of Treasury 
securities directly into the representative agent’s utility function.  As one rationale for doing so, they cite 
the “surety” of Treasuries—i.e., the fact that Treasuries are riskless.  Like I do, they posit that surety has an 
extra value above and beyond that which is captured in a standard asset-pricing model.  See also Sidrauski 
(1967) for an early model with money in the utility function.   8
each that banks use.  In other words, looser policy encourages banks to lend more by 
enabling them to tilt their capital structure towards cheap money financing, thereby 
lowering their weighted average cost of funds. 
  B.  Banks 
  Households cannot invest their time-0 endowments directly in physical projects, 
because they do not have the monitoring expertise to do so.  This investment must be 
undertaken by banks, who in turn issue financial claims—in the form of either riskless 
money or risky bonds—to households.  There is a continuum of such banks, with total 
mass of one.  Each bank faces the following investment opportunities.  If an amount I is 
invested at time 0, and the good state prevails, which happens with probability p, total 
output at time 2 is given by the concave function ( ) f II > .  If instead the bad state 
prevails, total expected output at time 2 is  I I λ ≤ , and there is a positive probability that 
output collapses all the way to zero.  In particular, in the bad state, output is either λI/q 
with probability q, or zero with probability (1 – q). 
  At time 1, there is a public signal that reveals whether the good or bad state will 
be realized at time 2.  At time 1 it is also possible for a bank to sell any fraction of its 
existing physical assets to a patient investor.
11  If a fraction Δ of the assets are sold, total 
proceeds to the bank are given by  kI λ Δ , where 0≤ k ≤ 1, and the remaining unsold assets 
yield output at time 2 to the bank of (1 ) I λ −Δ .  Thus k is a measure of the discount to 
expected value associated with a time-1 asset sale.  A central feature of the model is that 
k is endogenous, and depends on total asset sales by all banks in the economy.  The 
equilibrium determination of k will be discussed shortly.    
                                                 
11 Since households only consume at time 0 and time 2, they do not consume the proceeds of any time-1 
asset sales until time 2.  One can think of them as simply sitting on these proceeds in the interim. 
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    Other than their access to investment opportunities, banks have no initial 
endowments, and hence must raise the entire amount I externally.  They can do so by 
issuing either short-term (maturing at time 1) or long-term (maturing at time 2) debt 
claims to households.  Note that if they finance with long-term debt, no amount of this 
debt can ever be riskless, since there is a positive probability of the assets yielding zero 
output at time 2. By contrast, short-term debt can be made riskless, if not too much is 
issued.  This is because by forcing an asset sale upon seeing a bad signal at time 1, short-
term creditors can escape early with a sure value equal to the proceeds from the sale. 
  These assumptions are starker than they need to be.  In a more general model 
where the lowest possible value of output at time 2 is greater than zero, banks can issue 
some riskless long-term debt—so there is no longer a one-to-one mapping between debt 
maturity and the ability for debt to be made risk-free.  Nevertheless, it will always be the 
case that banks can create a larger quantity of riskless claims by issuing short-maturity 
debt; the early-escape intuition still holds.  Since there is a fixed premium on riskless 
claims, banks will continue to be tempted to issue short-term debt in this more general 
version of the model, and all the qualitative results below will continue to apply. 
The model can also be extended so that monetary services are provided not only 
by entirely riskless assets, but by any claims that are sufficiently low risk—i.e., by any 
claims whose worst-case payoff is at least x cents on the dollar.  What is critical is that 
there still be a violation of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) conditions, so that as a bank 
manufactures more of these low-risk money-like claims, it does not have to pay more for 
its remaining long-term debt, which becomes riskier.  This M-M violation is captured 
here in the assumption that the return on non-monetary claims, 
B R , is a constant.    10
  In any of these formulations, the key tradeoff is this: on the one hand, banks have 
an incentive to issue some short-term debt, because more of this debt can be made low-
risk—and hence by virtue of its money-ness, represents a cheap form of finance.
12  On 
the other hand, what keeps short-term debt safe is the bank’s ability to sell assets in the 
bad state.  As will become clear below, these sales of existing assets can lead to social 
costs that are not always fully internalized by individual banks when they pick their 
capital structures.  As a result, there may be excessive private money creation by banks. 
  Suppose that a bank raises a fraction m of its total investment of I by issuing 
short-term debt.  If this short-term debt can be made riskless, it will carry a rate of return 
of 
M R , and the bank will owe its short-term creditors a repayment of  
M mIR M ≡ .  Can 
it meet this promise in the bad state by selling assets if necessary?  From above, if it sells 
a fraction Δ of its assets, total proceeds are  kI λ Δ , so we require that: 
 
M kI m I R λ Δ= , or 
M mR
kλ
Δ= .         ( 2 )  








= .           ( 3 )  
 Thus the potential for asset sales makes it possible for a bank to create riskless private 
money, by issuing short-term debt—so long as the amount issued is not too large.   
  Is it also the case that asset sales are an unavoidable consequence of money 
creation?  One might think that since holding on to assets is positive-NPV relative to 
selling them at time 1, it might be possible for a bank to raise new funding at time 1 to 
                                                 
12 Other theories of short-term financing include Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991), and Stein (2005), who 
stress its signaling properties, and Diamond and Rajan (2001) who argue that short-term debt is a valuable 
disciplining device, particularly for financial intermediaries.   11
pay off the departing short-term creditors, and thereby avoid forced sales.  However, if 
one assumes that any new funding must be subordinated to existing long-term debt, such 
new funding may be blockaded by a severe debt overhang problem (Myers (1977)), given 
the low value of the assets in the bad state relative to the total face amount of already-
issued debt.
13  Thus under plausible circumstances, private money creation inevitably 
leads to some amount of asset sales.
14  
  Before moving on, it is worth fleshing out an issue of interpretation about the 
banks in the model.  In the real world, banks do not invest in physical projects directly, 
but rather lend to firms who in turn do the project selection.  Abstracting away from this 
extra layer of activity, as I do here, is tantamount to assuming that there are no 
contracting frictions between operating firms and banks, i.e. that firms can costlessly 
pledge all of their output to the banks.  This then raises the question of whether it is 
appropriate to interpret what I label “banks” as really being financial intermediaries, as 
opposed to operating firms that borrow directly from households in the securities market.    
  To create a meaningful distinction, suppose that any individual operating firm, 
once funded, always has some probability of immediate (i.e., before time 1) idiosyncratic 
failure, in which case it becomes public knowledge that its output will be zero in both the 
                                                 
13 In particular, denoting the face value of the existing long-term debt by B, it must be that M + B > I, in 
order for the bank to have raised I at time 0 by issuing money and bonds.  If the bank now wants to raise an 
amount M to pay off the short-term creditors in the bad state at time 1, it must do so by issuing new claims 
that are junior to the existing long-term debt.  But given that they are junior, the value of these claims in the 
bad state is only q(λI/q – B).  For q large enough (certainly for q > λ) the value of the new claims is 
necessarily less than M, so refinancing the short-term debt is impossible. 
 
14 This line of argument leaves open the question of why the original long-term financing for the bank is in 
the form of senior debt, as opposed to say equity, or some other junior security that allows for new 
financing to come in on top of it.  Following Hart and Moore (1995), it may be that this seniority of the 
long-term debt represents a valuable pre-commitment in the more likely good state of the world.  For 
example, it may prevent managers from using assets in place as collateral for empire-building investments.  
Thus, as in Hart and Moore, senior long-term debt is a double-edged sword: it serves to discipline wayward 
managers in the good state, but forces underinvestment (here, in the form of asset sales) in the bad state.    12
good and bad states.  This risk of failure makes it impossible for an operating firm to ever 
issue riskless claims in any amount.  Banks, on the other hand, represent highly 
diversified portfolios of such firm-level projects, and therefore their assets always have 
positive expected value as of time 1, as assumed above.  The diversification associated 
with banks is thus a necessary condition for them to create riskless claims.
15   
  C.  Patient Investors 
  Patient investors (PIs) are another type of intermediary, and as such, any output 
that they produce reverts to the household sector at time 2.  As a group, PIs are endowed 
with resources of W at time 1.  For simplicity, I treat this endowment as exogenous for 
now, but it can be endogenized by allowing the PIs to raise the W from the household 
sector at time 0 by issuing risky long-term claims.  In this case, the PIs choose an optimal 
level of W at time 0 that equates the expected return on their time-1 investments to the 
cost of capital 
B R .  Imposing this ex-ante breakeven condition does not affect the 
qualitative results of the model, so I ignore it for the time being, and return to it later.  
  What is crucial is that when time 1 rolls around and the state of the world is 
realized, W is fixed.  Thus while it is fine to think of PIs as having full access to financial 
markets at time 0, they cannot go back and raise more at time 1 once they know the state 
of the world.  In other words, W is an unconditional war chest, with the same amount 
available to PIs in the good and bad states. 
  PIs can do one of two things with their resources at time 1.  First, they can invest 
in new, late-arriving real investment projects.  Irrespective of the state of the world, an 
                                                 
15 Thus, as in other models of intermediation, both pooling (i.e., diversification) and tranching (i.e., the 
issuance of properly structured senior securities) have roles to play in creating low-risk claims.   See, e.g., 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), and DeMarzo (2005).  Diamond (1984) also 
emphasizes the importance of diversification to the process of intermediation.   13
investment of K in such new projects at time 1 yields expected gross output of g(K) at 
time 2, where g( ) is a concave function.  Alternatively, PIs can absorb assets being sold 
by banks at time 1.  In the good state, there are no asset sales, so the PIs invest all of W in 
new projects, yielding g(W). In the bad state, banks have to sell enough assets to repay 
short-term creditors the M they have promised them.  Thus in equilibrium, PIs spend M 
on asset purchases, and invest only (W – M) in new projects, yielding g(W – M).  For the 
PIs to be willing to allocate their endowment in this way, it must be that the marginal 
return on new projects is the same as the marginal return from buying existing assets 





′ =−          ( 4 )  
  Equation (4) makes clear the real costs of fire sales, and hence of short-term debt 
financing by banks.  The greater is M, and hence the more bank assets that the PIs have to 
absorb in the bad state at time 1, the less they have left over for investment in new 
projects.  With scarce PI capital, the return on secondary-market arbitrage opportunities 
(buying up fire-sold assets) also becomes the hurdle rate for new investment, a point 
emphasized by Diamond and Rajan (2009a) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010).  
  For expositional purposes, I am treating the PIs and the banks as two distinct 
categories of intermediaries.  This is not necessary; one could alternatively merge them 
into a single entity that has investment opportunities at both time 0 and time 1, that issues 
some short-term debt at time 0, and that also holds liquidity W in reserve at time 0.  This 
re-interpretation of the model is innocuous, subject to one caveat: it is crucial that the 
merged entities behave not as autarkic islands, but rather as price-takers who can transact 
in the asset market at time 1.  Thus even if a bank satisfies most of its departing creditors   14
by drawing down on its own stock of liquidity at time 1, it must continue to consider the 
possibility of asset sales to another bank.  This feature emerges naturally if we move 
away from the knife-edge case where the scales of time-0 and time-1 investment are in 
identical proportions across all banks. If so, those that have relatively bigger time-1 scale 
will tend to stockpile more W relative to their short-term debts, and hence will be buyers 
of assets from those who have bigger time-0 scale.  My two-categories formulation can 
be thought of as capturing an extreme case of this heterogeneity. 
  D. The Bank’s Optimization Problem 
  Let us now formulate the optimization problem for a bank that invests an amount 
I and finances it with some fraction 
max mm ≤  of money.  The bank’s expected net profits 
at time 2 are given by: 
 {( ) ( 1 ) } ( ) ( 1 )
BB M M pfI p I I R m IR R pz m I R λ Π= + − − + − − −    (5) 





=  as the net rate of return on fire-sold assets.  (Note that 
higher values of z correspond to larger fire-sale discounts, and z = 0 is the case where 
there is no discount.)  The three terms in (5) are easily interpreted.  The first, 
{( ) ( 1 ) }
B pfI p I I R λ +− − , is the NPV of investment assuming that it is entirely financed 
at the higher bond-market rate—and hence that there is no need to ever sell assets.  The 
second term,  ( )
BM mI R R − , is the financing cost savings associated with using a fraction 
m of money in the capital structure.  And the last term, (1 )
M p zmIR − , captures the 
expected fire sale losses associated with this riskier short-term capital structure. 







≤= .  I assume that each bank treats the fire-sale discount k   as a fixed   15
constant—i.e., they do not internalize the incremental impact of their choices on the fire-
sale outcome.  By contrast, when I examine the social planner’s problem below, the key 
difference will be that the planner takes into account the dependence of k on the capital 
structure of the banks.  The Lagrangian for the bank’s problem is thus: 




pf I p I IR mI R R p zmIR m
R
λ
λη =+ − − +− − − − −
B L  (6) 
where η  is the shadow value of the collateral constraint.  Taking the first-order condition 
with respect to m, we have: 
 {( ) (1 ) }
BM M IR R p z R η −− − =        ( 7 )  
It follows that the collateral constraint binds, and the bank is at a corner, setting 
max mm = , if ( ) (1 )
BM M R Rp z R −> − , i.e., if the equilibrium spread between bonds and 
money is sufficiently large.  Alternatively, if the spread is smaller in equilibrium (that is, 
if  ( ) (1 )
BM M R Rp z R −= − ), then the bank chooses an interior value of m, and  0 η = . 
The first-order condition with respect to I yields: 
() ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) 0 .
BB M M pf I p R m R R p zmR λ ′ +− − + − −− =    ( 8 )  
Using (7), we can re-write (8) as follows: 
() ( 1 )
B m




− ′ +− − =       ( 9 )  
 There are two ways that (9) can be satisfied.  First, the bank can be at an interior 
solution with respect to m, in which case  0 η = , and therefore  ( ) (1 )
B pfI p R λ ′ +− = .  
Alternatively, the bank can be at a corner with  
max mm = , and  0 η > , in which case it 
follows that  ( ) (1 )
B pfI p R λ ′ +− < .  This reasoning leads to the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1:  D e f i n e  I
B as the optimal level of investment for a bank that 
finances itself exclusively in the long-term bond market:  ( ) (1 ) 0
BB pf I p R λ ′ + −− = .  
The solution to the bank’s problem involves two regions.  In the low-spread region (for 
()
BM R R −  relatively small) the bank chooses 
max mm <  and I*= I
B.  In the high-spread 
region (for ( )
BM R R −  relatively large) the bank chooses 
max mm =  and I*> I
B. 
 
The point to take away from the proposition is that in the low-spread region, a 
bank’s investment and financing choices are decoupled, while in the high-spread region 
they are interdependent. This is because when 
max mm < , a bank’s ability to tap low-cost 
money financing is not constrained by the amount of investment it does.  By contrast, in 
the high-spread region in which 
max mm = , a bank faces a binding collateral constraint—it 
can only issue more money if it increases the quantity of physical assets backing its debts.  
This is what ties investment and financing decisions together. If money financing is 
cheap enough that banks want to do a lot of it, and they begin to bump up against the 
collateral constraint, they will be induced to invest more so as to loosen the constraint.  
 
III.  Socially Excessive Money Creation: A Role for Regulation 
The next step in the analysis is to identify the circumstances in which the process 
of private money creation described above involves an externality—i.e., when the level 
of money creation chosen by banks exceeds that preferred by a benevolent social planner.  
A. The Social Planner’s Problem 
  Given that all output of the banks and the PIs ultimately accrues to the household 
sector, the social planner seeks to maximize the utility of a representative household, as   17
given by equation (1).  It is easily shown that, disregarding constants, this utility, 
expressed in units of time-2 consumption, is equivalent to:
16  
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Comparing this to the bank’s expected profits in (5), we can see that the first two 
terms coincide.  The difference is in the latter three terms: the planner does not care about 
expected fire sale losses per se, because these only represent a transfer from the banks to 
the PIs.  However, the planner does care about the net expected returns to investment by 
the PIs, as captured by:  ( ) (1 ){ ( ) }
B pgW p gW M M W R +− − + − . 







≤= .  Denoting the shadow value of the constraint in this case by 
P η , and 
recalling that 
M M mIR = , the Lagrangian for the planner’s problem is given by: 
{( ) ( 1 ) } ( )
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   (11) 
 In taking the first-order conditions for this problem, it is important to note that, 
unlike an individual bank, the planner recognizes the dependence of k on the average 




gW m I R
=
′ −
.   
Using this fact, the first-order condition with respect to m can be written as: 
                                                 
16 In particular, suppose households have a fixed time-0 endowment of Y, and that they invest I of this 
endowment with the banks and W with the PIs at time 0. It follows that C0 = Y  – I – W, and that C2 = f(I) + 
g(W) with probability p, and  C2 = λI + g(W – M) + M with probability (1 – p).  The expression in (10) then 
follows from also including the monetary services γM  in the utility function, and multiplying time-0 values 
by R
B to put everything in common units of time-2 consumption. 
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Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to I can be expressed as: 
2
()
() ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) .
(( ) )
BB M M P g
pfI p R m R R p z m R m
g
λ ηλ
′′ ⋅ ′ +− − + − −− = −
′ ⋅
 (13) 
Comparing equations (7) and (12), and equations (8) and (13), we can see that the 
bank’s private solution coincides exactly with the social planner’s solution in the low-
spread region where ( ) (1 )
BM M R Rp z R −= − , and where the collateral constraint is non-
binding, i.e. where  0
P ηη == .  In this case, equation (13) reduces to equation (8), 
meaning that the planner chooses the same level of I as the bank.  
By contrast, in the high-spread region where the constraint binds, so that  0
P η > , 










, describes the wedge between the 
bank’s solution and the planner’s solution.  Since  () 0 g′′ ⋅ < , this term is positive, which 
implies that the marginal product of investment is higher in the social planner’s solution, 
or alternatively that I is lower.  In other words, in this region, the social planner would 
like to restrain investment, and hence money creation, relative to the private outcome. 
The following proposition summarizes the analysis. 
 
Proposition 2:  Denote the private and socially optimal values of investment I by 
I
* and I
** respectively, and similarly for the private and socially optimal values of money 
creation M.  In the low-spread region, I
*  = I
**, and M
*  = M
**.  In the high-spread region, 
I
*  > I
**, and M
*  > M
**.   
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Thus banks may create a socially excessive amount of money, but this happens 
only if the spread between money and bonds ( )
BM R R −  is high enough.  If the spread is 
so low that any individual bank choose an interior value of money creation 
max mm < , 
there is no divergence between private and social incentives. 
 
Example 1: Pick these functional forms and parameter values:  f(I) = ψlog(I) + I, 
g(K) = θlog(K), R
B = 1.04; R
M = 1.01; ψ = 3.5; θ = 150; λ = 1; W = 140; and p = 0.98.  
For these values, the private optimum is in the high-spread region, and involves banks 
choosing M*= 57.6 and I*=104.9 , with an associated rate of return on fire-sale assets of z 
= 82.1% (k = 0.549).  By contrast, in the social optimum, the planner chooses M**= 55.2 
and I**= 97.7, leading to a rate of return on fire-sale assets of z = 77.0% (k = 0.565). 
 
Figure 1 expands on Example 1, keeping all of the other parameter values the 
same as above, but allowing R
M to vary between 1.00 and 1.035, thereby causing the 
bond-money spread ( )
BM R R − to vary between 50 and 400 basis points.  As can be seen, 
for low values of the spread, the private and socially optimal values of M and I coincide.  
But as the spread widens, these values diverge further and further from one another.  
B.  Understanding the Nature of the Externality 
At first glance, it may not be clear why fire sales create a divergence between 
private and socially optimal outcomes.  After all, the price impact of liquidations is a 
pecuniary externality, and pecuniary externalities by themselves need not lead to 
violations of the standard welfare theorems.  The result in Proposition 2 is a specific case 
of the generic inefficiency result in economies with incomplete markets (Geanakoplos   20
and Polemarchakis (1986), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)). Perhaps the closest analog is 
Lorenzoni (2008), who also shows how there can be socially excessive borrowing in an 
economy with financial frictions.  In the current setting, the key friction is the presence of 
a binding collateral constraint.  This can be seen in the expression for the wedge between 
the bank’s first-order condition and that of the planner; as noted above, this wedge is 










.  Thus when the collateral constraint does not bind, i.e. when 
0
P η = , there is no wedge, and the private and social solutions coincide.  By contrast, 










to the extent that an increase in the quantity of liquidations widens the fire-sale discount, 
or equivalently, raises the marginal product of time-1 investment by the PIs. 
  The intuition behind this result can be understood as follows.  When the constraint 
does not bind, equation (7) tells us that, in deciding how much money to create, each 
bank trades off the lower financing cost ( )
BM R R − associated with money against the 
potential for greater fire-sales discounts (1 )
M p zR − .  But according to equation (12), this 
is exactly the same tradeoff that the planner faces in attempting to balance the marginal 
value of monetary services to households against the marginal cost of underinvestment by 
the PIs.  Hence in this case, everything is well-internalized.  
By contrast, when the constraint binds, and each bank is setting 
max mm = , an 
incremental increase in money creation by any one bank has an added effect: by reducing 
the equilibrium value of k, it effectively lowers the collateral value of all other bank’s 
assets, thereby tightening their collateral constraints and impinging on their ability to 
create money.  Thus when any one bank creates an additional unit of money, and captures   21
the private benefit for doing so, the social benefit is less than that one unit of money, 
since other banks can no longer produce as much M for a given level of I.
17 
  The result that there is no externality in the low-spread region when 
max mm <  is 
dependent on the strong assumption that, when the PIs invest in real projects, they 
capture all the social surplus associated with these projects.  If one adds another financial 
friction to the model, and makes this surplus only partially pledgeable, private money 
creation is always socially excessive, irrespective of parameter values.  In particular, 
suppose that the social return to an investment project financed by a PI is still given by 
g(K), but that only φg(K) can be pledged to the PI, with φ < 1.  In this case, the 




ϕ ′ =− .  That is, a given 
amount of underinvestment by the PIs is now associated with a smaller fire-sale discount.  
Hence a bank’s aversion to fire sales no longer leads it to fully internalize the social costs 
of underinvestment.   
  This imperfect-pledgeability variant of the model is briefly explored in the 
appendix.  Since it is possible to make many of the key normative points that follow 
without introducing imperfect pledgeability, there is a certain minimalist appeal to 
focusing on the perfect-pledgeability limit of  φ = 1, as I do in the remainder of the text.  
However, if one is interested in generating more realistic comparative statics along some 
dimensions, the augmented version of the model that allows for φ < 1 may be better 
suited to doing so.  For example, I show in the appendix that the perfect-pledgeability 
version of the model yields the somewhat counter-intuitive implication that the central 
                                                 
17 Think of two Banks A and B as factories that each have a technology for producing money out of 
physical assets.  When the collateral constraint binds, an incremental increase in money production by A is 
equivalent to a form of pollution that gums up B’s production technology, since it reduces the amount of 
money that B can manufacture out of a given stock of physical assets.   22
bank should lower nominal interest rates when the risk of a financial crisis is greater.   If 
instead we posit that φ < 1, this result can easily be reversed. 
   C.  A “Cap-and-Trade” Approach to Bank Liquidity Regulation 
The analysis thus far makes clear that in some cases banks will choose to create 
more money than is socially optimal, thereby inflicting inefficiently high levels of fire 
sales on the economy.  This suggests a role for regulation.  In the full-information case, in 
which the regulator observes all the relevant parameters of the model, the social optimum 
can be easily implemented with a cap on money creation: each bank can simply be 
prohibited from issuing more short-term claims than the desired level of M**, which the 
regulator can directly compute from equations (12) and (13). 
However, if the regulator is imperfectly informed, it becomes more challenging to 
set the cap appropriately.
18  Consider a situation in which banks know the productivity of 
their investment opportunities—i.e., they know what the function f(I) looks like—but the 
regulator does not.  As can be seen from equation (13), the value of I**, and hence the 
value of M**,  depends on the marginal product of investment  () f I ′ .  Intuitively, it 
makes sense to allow banks to create more cheap money financing when they have better 
investment opportunities.  Thus without knowledge of the value of  () f I ′ , it is impossible 
for the regulator to target the socially optimal level of money creation with a simple cap. 
One way for the regulator to generate the required information is through a 
system of cap-and-trade.  In particular, each bank can be granted permits that allow it to 
issue some amount of money; by picking the aggregate quantity of permits, the regulator 
can, as before, effectively target the total amount of money M in the economy.   
                                                 
18 Weitzman (1974) is the seminal paper on regulation in the face of parameter uncertainty. 
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Moreover, if the permits can be traded among banks, their market-clearing price P(M) 









19  And conditional on the regulator knowing the other 




 allows him to infer the value of  ( ) f I ′ . 
It follows from this reasoning that the regulator can implement the M** solution 
by making the permits tradable, and then targeting the appropriate price for these permits 
by varying the available quantity.  That is, the regulator adjusts the quantity of permits, 
looking for a fixed point where the market-clearing price P(M) equals a target value 
P
T(M) that itself depends on the quantity of permits.  To calculate this target value, recall 
that, in the high-spread region when 

























Using equation (12), we can substitute for  
P η to obtain the following result: 
 
 Proposition 3: A regulator who is imperfectly informed about the nature of bank 
lending opportunities can implement the desired level of money M** with a system of 
tradable permits for money creation.  This involves adjusting the number of permits such 





















′ − ⋅ =− − ′′ ⋅
−
′ ⋅
     ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
19 Note that since the banks in the model are all identical, the volume of trade in the permits is zero.  
Nevertheless, there is a unique equilibrium price, given by the common shadow value of the M-constraint. 
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To be clear on the implementation, suppose the regulator picks an initial trial 
value of M.  At this value, the regulator can calculate the target price of permits P
T(M) 
from (14), based on his knowledge of M and the other observable parameters of the 
model—as can be seen from (14), he does not need to know anything about the value of 
() f I ′  to evaluate  P
T(M).  If the market price of permits P(M) turns out to be higher than 
P
T(M), the regulator increases M, and vice-versa.  The optimum M**  is that value of M 
where the target price in (14) coincides with the market price. 
 
Example 2: Keep everything the same as in Example 1:  f(I) = ψlog(I) + I, g(K) = 
θlog(K), R
B = 1.04; R
M = 1.01; ψ = 3.5; θ = 150; λ = 1; W = 140; and p = 0.98.  At the  
social optimum of M** =  55.2, the price of permits is P = 0.0056.  Now suppose there is 
a positive productivity shock, and ψ rises to 4.0.  If the cap is not adjusted, the price of 
permits spikes to P = 0.0146.  However, this price increase reveals the new value of ψ to 
the regulator, who can increase the number of permits in the system, raising the quantity 
of money in the system to its new optimal value of M** =  58.9.  At this new optimum, 
the price of permits is given by P = 0.0054.  
 
The example suggests that, in the face of productivity shocks, it is optimal for the 
regulator to actively lean against incipient changes in the price of permits. When a 
positive shock pushes the price of permits up, the regulator should increase the supply of 
permits, thereby driving their price back down.  In fact, optimality in this setting requires 
the supply response to be sufficiently strong that the equilibrium price of permits actually 
falls slightly as productivity rises.   25
D.  Relationship to Pigouvian Taxation 
A handful of recent papers have suggested that a system of Pigouvian taxes might 
be used to force banks to properly internalize any systemic externalities they create (e.g., 
Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Kocherlakota (2010), Perotti and Suarez (2010)).  In the 
current context, this would amount to imposing a tax τ on each unit of money created by 
banks.  A couple of points about such taxes are worth noting. 
First, in the full-information case where the planner observes everything needed 
to compute the socially-optimal level of money creation M**, this outcome can be 
achieved equally well either with a regulatory cap on money creation, or by picking the 
correct value of the tax τ.  Indeed, given full information, the regulator can implement 
M** simply by setting τ = P
T(M**), i.e., the target price of permits given by (14), 
calculated at the desired value of M**.  So Pigouvian taxes can be used, but in this setting 
they don’t add any value relative to more conventional quantity-based regulation. 
Second, in the incomplete-information case where the planner does not know 
enough to pick the right level of the cap, he also does not know enough to set the correct 
value of the tax τ, since the optimal tax depends on M**.  Thus an optimal system of 
Pigouvian taxation still requires a mechanism to elicit the private information.  So the 
cap-and-trade design remains useful, for the same reasons as before.  Indeed, one can 
interpret the cap-and-trade approach as a “smart” system of Pigouvian taxation, since for 
any individual bank the permit price is identical to the optimal tax on money creation.
20  
                                                 
20 This is not to say that cap-and-trade is the unique way of implementing the optimal scheme.  An 
alternative would be an iterative form of taxation: the regulator announces a trial value of the tax rate.  He 
then observes the quantity of M chosen by banks, and uses this to infer the productivity of their investment 
opportunities.  With this data, he can then set the optimal tax rate.  Thus rather than setting quantities and 
learning from market prices, the regulator sets prices (taxes) and learns from market-determined quantities. 
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IV.  Implementing the Cap-and-Trade Approach with Monetary Policy 
The cap-and-trade approach to bank regulation outlined above may seem alien—it 
does not have any direct counterpart in the real world.  However, I now argue that the 
cap-and-trade approach can be implemented with something that looks very much like 
conventional monetary policy—with open-market operations in which the central bank 
adjusts the quantity of nominal reserves in the banking system.  In this setting, reserves 
play the role of permits for money creation, given the existence of a binding reserve 
requirement.  And the nominal interest rate corresponds to the price of the permits. 
In drawing this analogy, one wrinkle is that I have so far been working in an 
entirely real economy.  To introduce a central bank and a role for monetary policy, I need 
to bring in a set of nominally-denominated government liabilities, and then pin down the 
price level.  To do so, I rely on the fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper (1991), Sims 
(1994), Woodford (1995), Cochrane (1998)).  In particular, the government is assumed to 
issue two types of nominal liabilities: Treasury bills, and bank reserves.  According to the 
fiscal theory, the sum of these two nominal liabilities is what is relevant for determining 
the price level.   And given the sum,  the composition of these liabilities is a real variable, 
since only reserves can be used to satisfy reserve requirements.  Thus holding fixed total 
government liabilities, when there are more reserves, banks are able to create more 
money, i.e. to finance a greater fraction of their operations with  short-term debt.  Hence 
reserves correspond exactly to the concept of regulatory permits in the real model.
21  By 
contrast, if Treasury bills could also be used to satisfy reserve requirements, there would 
be nothing special about reserves, and open-market operations would have no effect. 
                                                 
21 Since the price level is pinned down by fiscal considerations, the goal of achieving price stability cannot 
be the central bank’s job.  Rather, the central bank is left with just the role of financial-stability regulator.   27
To operationalize the fiscal theory, I assume that the government anticipates real 
tax revenues of T at time 2, and that the value of T is exogenously fixed.  At time 0, the 
government has total nominal liabilities outstanding of l0, composed of Treasury bills b0, 
and bank reserves r0.  Thus l0 = b0 + r0.  The time-0 price level Λ0, is then determined by 
the requirement that the real value of the government’s obligations must equal the present 








          ( 1 5 )  
Two points are worth noting here.  First, the relevant real discount rate for the 
government is 
M R , given that its obligations are riskless in this setting.  In other words, 
when households own Treasury bills, they derive the same monetary services from these 
bills that they do from privately-created bank money, so the return on Treasury bills is 
equal to 
M R .  Second, in order to keep real tax revenues fixed at T as the composition of 
government liabilities varies, I assume that the government rebates any seignorage 
revenues derived from the issuance of non-interest bearing reserves in a lump-sum 
fashion to the household sector.
22 
Again, the key distinction between Treasury bills and bank reserves is that only 
the latter can be used to satisfy reserve requirements.  In particular, any bank wishing to 
issue a dollar of short-term debt must hold ρ dollars of reserves, where ρ is the fractional 
reserve requirement.  Hence the net amount of short-term debt financing made possible 
                                                 
22 Without this assumption, the composition of government liabilities would influence real tax revenues.  In 
particular, as the government issued more non-interest-bearing reserves and fewer interest-bearing bills, its 
effective tax revenues would go up through a seignorage mechanism.  The assumption can be loosely 
motivated by the idea that the government has some kind of social compact with its citizens that prevent it 
from letting total tax revenues—no matter how they are raised—go above T.  
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by one dollar of reserves is (1 – ρ)/ρ dollars.
23  It follows that in real terms, the total 
amount of M that can be created by the banking sector is now given by: 
00
00










        ( 1 6 )  
This expression makes it clear that the ratio of r0 to l0—namely, the composition 
of the government’s nominal liabilities—is a real variable, and is the means by which the 
government can target total real money creation by banks.  An open-market operation 
that increases the supply of reserves relative to T-bills is isomorphic to an increase in the 
regulatory limit on M in the all-real cap-and-trade version of the model. 
Moreover, as noted above, the analog to the price of permits is the current setting 
is the nominal interest rate.  This is because when banks want to create money, they are 
forced to hold non-interest bearing reserves, and the nominal interest rate represents the 
opportunity cost of doing so. 








Λ= .         ( 1 7 )  
Now suppose a bank wishes to increase its net issuance of real M by one unit at 




.  To do so, it must increase net 
nominal M by Λ0 units, which requires it to hold ρΛ0/(1 – ρ) of nominal reserves.  To 
finance these reserve holdings, it must pay ρiΛ0/(1 – ρ) of nominal financing costs at time 
2.  The real time-2 value of these financing costs is therefore ρiΛ0/(1 – ρ)Λ2 or, using 
                                                 
23 As an example, suppose ρ = .10.  In this case, with one dollar of reserves, a bank is allowed to raise 10 
dollars of short-term debt.  But given that it must hold the reserves as an asset, only 9 of these dollars 
represent net financing that is available to fund new loans.   29
equation (17),  ρiR
M/(1 – ρ)(1 + i).  For a bank to be indifferent, it must be that these real 
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Example 3: Keep everything the same as in Example 1:  f(I) = ψlog(I) + I, g(K) = 
θlog(K), R
B = 1.04; R
M = 1.01; ψ = 3.5; θ = 150; λ = 1; W = 140; and p = 0.98.  At the 




 = 0.0056.  With a reserve requirement 
of ρ = 0.10, if this optimum is implemented with monetary policy, the nominal interest 
rate is given by i = 5.25%.  (Since the nominal rate exceeds the riskless real rate of 1.0%, 
the implied rate of inflation between time 0 and time 2 is 4.25%.)  If we keep all else the 
same but set R
M = 1.02, the new optimum involves M** =  52.5, which is implemented 
with a nominal rate of i = 1.81%.  Intuitively, as the spread between money and bonds 
shrinks, banks have a weaker desire to create private money.  So the nominal interest rate, 
which is equivalent to the value of a permit for money creation, falls as well.  
 
V.  Other Policy Tools 
A.  Liquidity Regulation 
I have thus far taken the time-0 liquidity stockpile W of the PIs to be exogenous. 
This does not affect any of the conclusions in the foregoing analysis regarding the 
socially optimal quantity of money, since these conclusions hold for any value of W such 
that there is a scarcity of PI resources in the bad state at time 1.  However, I now pose 
two related questions about W.  First, if the PIs are allowed to choose W optimally, what   30
value will they pick?  And second, if the social planner is allowed to choose W, will his 
choice differ from that of the PIs?  In other words, is there a case for regulation of 
liquidity holdings, in addition to regulation of money creation? 
The privately-optimal choice of W, denoted by W*, is determined by the 
following first-order condition: 
()( 1 )( )
B pgW pgW M R ′′ +− − =        ( 1 9 )  
The logic is straightforward.  PIs raise W at time 0, paying a gross interest rate of 
B R .  
With probability p, the good state ensues, and the marginal return on their investment is 
() gW ′ .  With probability (1 – p), the bad state ensues, and the marginal return on 
investment is  ( ) gW M ′ − .  One interesting feature of this solution is that the more 
unlikely the bad state, the lower is the equilibrium value of W*, and hence the deeper is 
the fire-sale discount when the bad state does in fact occur. 
  To solve for the socially optimal value of W, denoted by W**, we can return to 
the planner’s Lagrangian from equation (11), and take the first-order condition with 
respect to W, which yields: 
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     ( 2 0 )  
Comparing (19) and (20), we can see that the private and social solutions once 
again diverge only when   0
P η > , i.e., when the collateral constraint binds.  Moreover, 











, is negative, meaning 
that the planner prefers a lower marginal product of W, or alternatively, a higher level of 
W.  Thus the optimal regulation takes the form of a floor on liquidity holdings by the PIs.      31
This result connects to Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), who also develop a 
rationale for liquidity regulation.  However, the mechanism in FGT is very different.  
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin (1987), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), 
and Allen and Gale (2004), they model banks as providers of insurance to consumers 
with unpredictable liquidity needs.  As this literature has shown, incentive-compatible 
insurance can be frustrated by the existence of securities markets, since “late” consumers 
may be tempted to mimic “early” consumers by withdrawing their money from the bank 
prematurely, and reinvesting it at the market rate of interest.  The insight of FGT is that 
liquidity requirements can be used to depress the security-market rate, thereby reducing 
the temptation for late consumers to withdraw early.  By contrast, in my model, real rates 
are pinned down by the linear preferences of households, and thus unaffected by liquidity 
requirements. Instead, the rationale for a liquidity requirement reflects a wholly different 
motivation, namely a desire to lessen the equilibrium fire-sale discount. 
While liquidity requirements arise naturally in my framework, there are a couple 
of caveats.  First, the liquidity requirements envisioned by the theory may be difficult to 
enforce.  To implement them efficiently, they have to be imposed on PIs at time 0, in 
proportion to the scale of each PI’s time-1 investment opportunities.
24  But a regulator 
may not know at time 0 what the distribution of time-1 projects across PIs looks like.  By 
contrast, the monetary regulation described above does not face this enforcement 
problem, since short-term debt issuance is contemporaneously observable, at time 0. 
Second, in the limited set of numerical experiments that I have tried, the planner’s 
utility gain from imposing liquidity regulation turns out to be much smaller than that 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, in the interpretation of the model where the banks and the PIs are merged into a single 
entity, optimal liquidity regulation would involve requiring larger holdings of W by those entities with 
larger-scale investment opportunities at time 1.  Again, this information may be hard to ascertain at time 0.   32
from regulating the creation of private money.  Combined with the enforcement problem 
just above, this helps explain why the primary focus of the analysis in this paper has been 
on the latter.  The following example is illustrative of the magnitudes that arise. 
 
Example 4: Keep everything the same as in Example 1, except allow W to be 
chosen endogenously:  f(I) = ψlog(I) + I, g(K) = θlog(K), R
B = 1.04; R
M = 1.01; ψ = 3.5; θ 
= 150; λ = 1; and p = 0.98.  The PIs’ optimal choice of W is given by W* =  146.31, 
whereas the social optimum is given by W** =  147.04.  Compared to a benchmark case 
with no regulation at all, the following regulatory configurations produce these increases 
in the planner’s utility: i) regulation only of money creation: +0.0148; ii) regulation of 
both money creation and liquidity: +0.0167; and iii) regulation of just liquidity: +0.0014.  
Thus in this example, the benefit of liquidity regulation is approximately one-tenth that 
which comes from regulating money creation. 
 
  B.  Deposit Insurance and Lender of Last Resort 
In the baseline version of the model, the only way for banks to pay off their short-
term creditors in the crisis state is by fire-selling their assets, and the only role for policy 
is to control the amount of short-term debt that is created ex ante. An alternative approach 
would be for the government to try to stem the amount of socially costly fire sales that 
occur for a given amount of short-term bank debt.  This could be done either with either 
deposit insurance, or a lender-of-last resort policy.     
  Unlike in the classic framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), such policies are 
not costless to the government in equilibrium, because here, in the crisis state, there is a   33
probability (1 – q) that the banks’ assets will turn out to be entirely worthless.  So there is 
always a chance that taxpayers will be left on the hook.  If taxpayer-financed bailouts 
create deadweight losses, the overall optimum set of policies may have the realistic 
feature that: i) some fraction of banks’ money-like claims are insured by the government; 
ii) the remainder are uninsured, and hence still subject to fire-sale risk; and iii) as before, 
it makes sense for the regulator to control the total quantity of bank-created money. 
  To see this explicitly, consider a case where the deadweight costs of taxation take 
the following form: there is no cost to raising any amount less than L to pay for a bailout, 
but it is infinitely costly to raise anything more than L.   It follows that the amount of 
government-insured money that can be created, M
I, is bounded by M
I ≤ L, and it will in 
fact always be optimal to set M
I = L.  Note too that if the government offers insurance on 
some amount of bank deposits, it will have to put in place a rule to  prevent banks from 
selling all of their assets in a crisis state to satisfy the demands of uninsured depositors; 
otherwise banks will create just as much uninsured money as before, and the deposit 
insurer will always be left holding an empty shell in the crisis state.  A simple version of 
such a rule—which can effectively be thought of as a ban on fraudulent conveyance—is a 
requirement that the fraction of assets sold in a crisis, Δ, not exceed the relative 









U is the quantity of uninsured money created by the bank. 
  It follows that the total amount of money—insured plus uninsured—that can be 
created must satisfy the same collateral constraint as before: 
UI M MMk I λ =+≤.  The 
only thing that is changed is the determination of the fire-sale discount k.  Since insured   34
depositors are protected and do not need to demand repayment at time 1, only uninsured 




U gW M gW M L
k
′′ =−=− +        ( 2 1 )  
  In other words, the outcome in a world with limited deposit insurance is 
equivalent to that in a world with no deposit insurance, but where the wealth of the PIs is 
augmented from W to (W + L).  A given amount of total money creation now causes less 
fire-sale damage, and as a result, more money can be created in equilibrium.   
  Equation (21) also makes clear the close connection between deposit insurance 
and a lender-of-last-resort function.  Given that the government can never put itself in a 
position to lose more than L, an alternative to deposit insurance would be for it to leave 
all deposits uninsured, but to commit to step in and invest L alongside the PIs in the event 
of a fire sale. This would have exactly the same effect—it would reduce the fire-sale 
discount per equation (21), and thereby allow for more total money creation. 
  The bottom line is that one can add deposit insurance to the model in such a way 
as to make it more realistic, without changing any of its qualitative properties.  The 
optimal policy mix will involve limited use of deposit insurance or equivalently, limited 
use of a lender-of-last-resort function.   Banks will continue to issue uninsured money-
like claims alongside insured deposits, and hence will continue to create some degree of 
fire-sale risk.  Thus as before, there will continue to be a motive for regulating the 
creation of these uninsured short-term claims. 
  C.  Regulating the Shadow Banking System 
The model also assumes that all private money is manufactured by commercial 
banks that are subject to reserve requirements.  Hence private money creation can be   35
completely controlled by conventional open-market operations.  While this may be an 
adequate representation of an earlier period in history, it omits an important form of 
money creation in the modern economy.  As Gorton and Metrick (2010) and Gorton 
(2010) emphasize, private money—in precisely the sense meant here—is also created by 
the unregulated shadow banking system, via the large volume of repo finance that is 
collateralized by securitized loan pools of one form or another.   
This observation suggests that commercial banks and shadow banks should be 
regulated in a symmetric fashion.  According to the logic of the model, the ideal way to 
do this would be to broaden the reach of reserve requirements, so that the cap-and-trade 
regime covers all the short-term liabilities of both commercial banks and shadow banks.   
If, due to some political constraint outside the model, the liabilities of shadow banks 
cannot be subjected to reserve requirements, an alternative approach might be to impose a 
regime of “haircut” requirements on their investments. In particular, the central bank 
could specify the maximum fraction of private money—that is, repo financing—that 
could be issued against a given amount of collateralizable assets.   Moreover, just as the 
optimal quantity of bank-created money M** varies with economic conditions, optimal 
haircuts would respond to these conditions as well.  The appendix provides a brief 
analysis of haircut regulation.  It turns out that while such regulation is indeed useful, it is 
strictly less efficient than direct control of the quantity of privately-created money via, 
e.g., the sort of reserve-requirements-based mechanism outlined above. 
D.  Government Debt Maturity 
As we have seen, the magnitude of the externality associated with private money 
creation is related to the bond-money spread ( )
BM R R − : when the spread widens, the   36
wedge between the social and private returns to money creation goes up.  Thus an 
alternative way to moderate the externality would be to compress the spread.  In the 
current version of the model this is impossible—given the assumption of linear 
preferences, the spread is exogenously fixed and insensitive to asset supplies. 
However, if one changes the model so that the monetary services enjoyed by 
households are a concave function of the supply of money—i.e., there is diminishing 
marginal utility of money—then it becomes possible for the government to act on the 
bond-money spread.  For example, since short-term Treasury bills are riskless, they can 
provide the same monetary services as short-term bank debt.  Hence an increase in the 
supply of Treasury bills will, in this modified setting, reduce the bond-money spread. 
One appeal of dealing with the externality in this fashion is that unlike some other 
regulatory approaches, it does not invite evasion.  For example, if the scope of reserve 
requirements were broadened, private actors might try to get around limits on their ability 
to use short-term debt by using various forms of hidden borrowing, e.g., by embedding 
the borrowing in an opaque derivative contract.  In contrast, when the relative cost of 
short-term borrowing goes up—because the market has been saturated with riskless 
short-term claims—the incentive to create private money is blunted. 
In Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010), we use this observation as the point of 
departure for a normative theory of government debt maturity.  We argue that the 
government should choose a shorter debt maturity—and in particular, should issue more 
riskless T-bills—than it otherwise might, in an active effort to crowd out the short-term 
debt of financial intermediaries.  The argument is based on a principle of comparative 
advantage.  On the one hand, tilting its issuance towards short-term debt is not without   37
cost for the government, since with stochastic interest rates this increases the variability 
of future interest payments and ultimately disrupts efforts to smooth tax rates over time.  
On the other hand, short-term government debt, unlike the short-term debt of financial 
intermediaries, does not create fire-sale risk.  To the extent that the fire-sale externality is 
more costly to the economy at the margin than the disruption of tax smoothing, it can 
make sense for the government to take on a bigger role in providing the short-term 
riskless claims that the economy demands.
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Of course, precisely because of tax-smoothing considerations, it will not generally 
be optimal for the government to tilt so strongly towards short-maturity issuance as to 
entirely eliminate the bond-money spread in equilibrium.  Rather, optimal behavior by 
the government on this dimension will typically involve leaving the spread only partially 
compressed.  So while government debt maturity may be one helpful tool in addressing 
the problem of excessive private money creation, it is not a panacea, and it is unlikely to 
eliminate the usefulness of the other tools discussed above. 
E.  Interest on Reserves 
I have thus far assumed that the price level is determined outside the central bank, 
by the fiscal-theory mechanism. While this is a convenient modeling device, it is not an 
essential piece of the story.  An alternative approach, in the New-Keynesian spirit, would 
be to model prices as being anchored by the central bank’s adherence to a “Taylor rule” 
(Taylor 1993, 1999) which dictates its path for the short-term nominal rate. 
                                                 
25 To the extent that monetary services reflect an ability to transact between time 0 and 1 without threat of 
adverse selection, the relevant notion of risk is short-horizon risk—i.e., the potential for loss between time 
0 and time 1.  While long-term Treasuries offer certain ultimate payoffs, they are not riskless over short 
horizons if interest rates are stochastic.  Hence they can create adverse-selection problems in trade if one 
party to a transaction has a better ability to forecast changes in rates than the other.   38
However, this raises a potential problem of there being more objectives than tools.  
If the short-term nominal rate must satisfy a Taylor rule in order to maintain price 
stability, how can it also satisfy equation (18), which specifies its optimal value from a 
regulatory perspective?  One way out of this box is via the payment of interest on 
reserves (IOR), which many central banks around the world have been doing for years, 
and which the U.S. Federal Reserve first took up in October of 2008.  As Goodfriend 
(2002) points out, with IOR, there are two distinct methods for raising short-term 
nominal rates: either by increasing the interest paid on reserve balances, or by draining 
reserves from the system, thereby increasing their scarcity value.  These methods are not 
equivalent, since only the latter scarcity-based approach increases the effective “reserves 
tax” paid by banks, which has been the focus of the analysis above. 
Building on this observation, Kashyap and Stein (2011) argue that IOR allows the 
central bank to simultaneously accomplish two goals: i) set the short-term nominal rate in 
accordance with a Taylor rule; and ii) implement an optimal regulatory scheme of the sort 
described in this paper.  They note that in a regime with IOR, one can decompose the 
nominal federal funds rate f as follows: 
IOR SVR f ry =+          ( 2 2 )    
where  IOR r  is the level of interest paid on reserves, and the  SVR y  is the quantity-mediated 
scarcity value of reserves.  The latter term corresponds exactly to the variable i  in 
equation (18), as it reflects the opportunity cost to a bank of holding reserves.   
  For example, suppose that an analysis of the sort suggested by (18) yields the 
conclusion that, for regulatory purposes, the optimal value of i  (or equivalently, of  SVR y ) 
is 2.0%, while an application of the Taylor rule implies that the optimal value of f is   39
5.0%.   In this case, the central bank should set  IOR r  to 3.0%, and then adjust the quantity 
of reserves in the system until f equilibrates at 5.0%.   
 
VI.  A Distinctive Account of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Much of the discussion above has focused on the normative implications of the 
model.  But the model is also of interest as a positive account of the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  Three of its properties are particularly noteworthy in this 
regard.  First, monetary policy has real effects even though all prices are perfectly 
flexible.  Second, monetary policy works entirely through a quantitative effect on bank 
lending.  That is, the real rates on both money and bonds are fixed and independent of the 
stance of policy; an easing of policy impacts bank lending only because it enables banks 
to use more of the former, relatively cheaper, funding source.  This is a pure version of 
the bank lending channel, and as such helps to explain how monetary policy can have 
important real effects even when it does not move long-term open-market interest rates 
by much, or when firm investment is not very responsive to such open-market rates. 
Third, the model has the property that the central bank does not lose control of 
monetary policy when other, non-reservable forms of money are introduced.  Consider 
what happens if there is, in addition to the risky production technology already in the 
model, a safe storage technology.  Claims to this technology are riskless, and hence 
circulate as an alternative transactions medium alongside bank-created money, bearing 
the same gross interest rate of 
M R .  They are also not subject to reserve requirements.  
(To be more concrete, one can interpret these claims as money-market-fund deposits 
backed by Treasury bills.)  Even if the volume of these claims is large, nothing in the   40
model changes.  All real rates are already pinned down by the linearity of household 
preferences, and are therefore unaffected by the total quantity of money in circulation. 
The distinctive feature of the model in this regard is that the central bank’s ability 
to influence real outcomes derives not from its control over the total quantity of 
transactions-facilitating claims available to households, but rather from the fact that it is 
the unique provider of permits that allow banks to issue short-term debt and hence 
finance themselves more cheaply.  Simply put, only central-bank-provided reserves can 
be used to satisfy the reserve requirements that constrain short-term debt issuance by 
banks.  This “permits” aspect of monetary policy is also emphasized in Stein (1998), 
though the model in that paper differs significantly on other dimensions.
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VII.  Conclusions 
  The basic message of this paper can be summarized as follows.  Banks and other 
financial intermediaries like to fund themselves with short-term debt. With sufficient 
collateral backing it, this short-term debt can be made into riskless money, which, 
because of the transactions services it generates, represents a cheap source of finance for 
banks.  While society benefits from this private money creation, banks’ private incentives 
lead them to overdo it, since they do not fully internalize the fire-sales costs that are a 
byproduct of their maturity-transformation activities. The externality associated with 
excessive private money creation provides the fundamental rationale for financial-
stability regulation, and arguably, for the existence of central banks. 
                                                 
26 In Stein (1998), reserves are effectively permits that allow banks to access the deposit insurance fund.  
Since banks face an adverse-selection problem in raising uninsured finance, an increase in the quantity of 
reserves can move lending closer to the first-best level.   41
  In a sufficiently simple institutional environment, the externality can be addressed 
with conventional monetary policy, complemented by either deposit insurance or a 
lender-of-last-resort facility.  Indeed, this is one interpretation of what central banks have 
done for much of their history. In a more realistic modern-day setting, where a substantial 
shadow-banking sector exists alongside traditional commercial banks, other tools, such as 
expanded reserve requirements, or haircut regulation, may also be necessary.  If so, 
central banks should not be reluctant to deploy these tools—to the extent that they do so 
in an effort to contain excessive private money creation, they can be said to be pursuing 
one of their traditional core missions in a more comprehensive and effective manner.   42
 Appendix 
  A.  A Variant of the Model  With Imperfect Pledgeability 
  As noted in the text, the result that there is no externality in the low-M region 
when 
max mm <  is dependent on the assumption that, when the PIs invest in real projects, 
they capture all the social surplus associated with these projects.  An alternative approach 
is to assume that the social return to a project financed by a PI is still given by g(K), but 
that only φg(K) can be pledged to the PI.  In this case, the equilibrium determination of k 




ϕ ′ =− . 
  Equation (7), the bank’s first-order condition with respect to m, still holds as 
stated. If the collateral constraint is not binding, so that  0 η = , this condition reduces to:  
() ( 1 ) 0 .
BM M RR p z R −− − =        ( A . 1 )  
However, the planner’s first-order condition for m in (12) is now modified, since we can 




′ =− .  Instead, if  0
P η = this condition can be written as: 
( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) 0
BM M M RR p z R p g W M R ϕ ′ −− − − −− − =    (A.2) 
Thus even in the low-spread region where 
max mm <  and I = I
B, there is now a 
wedge of (1 )(1 ) ( )
M p gW MR ϕ ′ −− −  between the private and social first-order 
conditions.  This implies that the optimal price of permits will now be strictly positive in 
this region.  Alternatively, in the monetary-policy implementation of the optimum, the 
nominal interest rate will now be strictly positive for all parameter values. 
Another noteworthy feature of this version of the model is that it implies different 
comparative statics than the baseline model with respect to the ex ante probability of a 
financial crisis, as captured by (1 – p).  Here, if we are in the low-spread region, an   43
increase in (1 – p) increases the wedge, and hence raises the optimal value of the permit 
price P, or equivalently, the nominal interest rate.  By contrast, in the baseline model with 
perfect pledgeability, equation (14) says that an increase in (1 – p) lowers the desired 
permit price.  Intuitively, the difference is that in the baseline version of the model, banks 
do a better job of internalizing the social costs of fire sales.  Indeed, when the risk of a 
fire sale goes up, banks become sufficiently more cautious about using short-term debt 
that they become better aligned with the social planner, which in turn implies that there is 
less need to rein them in by raising permit prices/interest rates.  However, with imperfect 
pledgeability, there is an effect in the opposite direction, since banks tend to underweight 
the social costs of fire sales even when the collateral constraint is not binding. 
B.  Haircut Regulation  
To see the effects of haircut regulation most transparently, consider the imperfect-
pledgeability version of the model described just above.  Suppose that we are in a 
“shadow-banking” economy where all else is the same as before, with one exception: it is 
impossible to regulate the absolute quantity of privately-created money M directly—say 
because shadow banks cannot be subjected to reserve requirements—but it is possible to 
impose a cap 
max cap mm <  on the fraction of investment that is money-financed.   
It turns out that this form of haircut regulation, while useful, is a second-best 
means of intervention as compared to controlling the aggregate quantity of money.  This 
is because the social costs of fire sales are a function of M, so this is the item that the 
planner would ideally like to control.  And trying to do this indirectly, by picking a value 
of 
cap m , will now have the undesired side-effect of encouraging shadow banks to raise 
their investment above the optimal level of 
B I .  (I am assuming that we are in the low-  44
spread region of the parameter space, so that absent haircut regulation, shadow banks 
would choose 
B I I = .)  Intuitively, haircut regulation always gives shadow banks the 
option to create more cheap money financing at the margin, so long as they are willing to 
raise the level of investment.  
This can be seen formally by considering the first-order condition with respect to 
I  for a shadow bank facing binding haircut regulation: 
( ) (1 ) {( ) (1 ) } 0
Bc a p BM M d
pf I p R m R R p zR
dI
λ
Π ′ =+ − − + − − − =    (A.3) 
It follows that it is impossible to use haircut regulation to implement the social 
optimum described in (A.2).  For if (A.2) is satisfied with I = I
B, it must be that 
( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) 0
BM M M RR p z R p g W M R ϕ ′ −− − = −− − > .  But then for (A.3) to be 
satisfied, i.e., for the shadow bank to be optimizing given the haircut constraint, we 
require ( ) (1 ) 0
B pf I p R λ ′ +− − <, which means that I > I
B.   45
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Figure 1  
Private and Socially Optimal Outcomes Versus the Money-Bond Spread  
 
The figure plots private and socially optimal values of money creation M and investment 
I as a function of R
M.  Functional forms and parameter values are as follows:  f(I) = 
ψlog(I) + I; g(K) = θlog(K); R
B = 1.04; ψ = 3.5; θ = 150; λ = 1; W = 140; and p = 0.98.  
R
M varies between 1.0 and 1.035. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  